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DESIGN DEFECTS UNDER THE PROPOSED
SECTION 2(b) OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY-A JUDGE'S VIEW
Hon. William A. Dreier*
The proposedsection 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability has caused a great deal of controversy, and many are
concerned that this section represents a radicalchange in the law.
This Article explains that section 2(b) in fact provides a pragmatic,
workable tool for judges and attorneys to explain and prove a
manufacturer'sliabilityfor a defective product. It sheds much of the
baggage of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A and its
commentaries, yet preserves the essence of the theory behind section
402A. The criticismsof the new language are adequately met in the
comments, except possibly for problems with (1) egregiously unsafe
products, or (2) products with little or no efficacy that should not be
marketedat all, but for which there is no safer design. Both problems
can still be cured by commentary in the final draft to be passed upon
in May 1997.

This Article focuses, with suitable digressions, on the differences between the considerations faced by a judge treating
a design defect claim under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and a similar claim under the proposed section
2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability. The
proposed section 2(b) has caused controversy because it contains
substantial textual changes from section 402A. The perception
has been that these textual changes signal substantive changes.
When section 2(b) is read together with the Reporters' extensive
comments, however, it becomes clear that this perception is
largely incorrect.
Against a background of section 402A and my experience in
New Jersey with the development of products liability law, as
well as additional references to applications in New York and
other states, this Article reviews some of the major criticisms
of section 2(b) and demonstrates that fears of a radical change
are unfounded. This Article reflects twenty-three years' experience as a member of the New Jersey judiciary, in the belief that
*
Presiding Judge, Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division. B.S. 1958,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1961, Columbia University School of Law.
The material in this Article should in no way be considered an official position of either
the author or the New Jersey courts.
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this background provides a vantage point in the area of products
liability that probably mirrors that of judges in other states.
Section 2(b) states that
a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.'
This Article argues that if the Reporters and the American Law
Institute (ALI) have performed their functions correctly, there
should be little or no difference in the treatment of the claims
under the old or new Restatements.2
In putting forth a Restatement, we as members of the ALI
basically invent nothing. Rather, we attempt to find a better
way to describe an existing area of the law so that attorneys can
advise clients, judges can charge juries, and professors can
instruct students, all with more precision. In my opinion, the
proposed Restatement (Third)does not make functional changes
in the law. Rather, it makes existing law more comprehensible
and usable.
An examination of the roots of section 402A and its subsequent adoption illustrates why I reach this conclusion. In the
Restatement (Second), section 402A included both manufacturing
and design defects.3 It then further explained in comment j that
the section also covered warning defects.4 Drawing upon the
seminal cases of Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,' Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products,Inc.,6 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,

1.

RESTATEMENT (THIMD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft,

Preliminary Version, 1996) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft].
Others, however, disagree. For example, Professor Marshall Shapo decries what
2.
he considers the new Restatement's flawed concepts and language. See Marshall S.
Shapo, In Searchof the Law ofProductsLiability:The ALIRestatement Project, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 631, 688-91 (1995); see also sources cited infra note 83.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. g, i (1965). Comment g
3.
discusses the requirements for a product to be considered in "safe condition" when
it is delivered. See id. § 402A cmt. g. Comment i discusses products that are inherently
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer . . . ." Id. § 402A cmt. i.
4.
See id. § 402A cmt. j.
391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
5.
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
6.
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Inc.,7 and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,8 the framers of
section 402A declared that a manufacturer or seller was liable
for selling an unsafe defective product.
Where the product contained a manufacturing defect, a
plaintiff no longer was required to demonstrate that the manufacturer's quality control was unreasonable.9 A manufacturer
could no longer say that it should not be liable because it did all
it could to prevent defective products from leaving the plant, it
complied with industry standards, or the only way the defect
could have been discovered would have been through destructive
testing.' ° In this respect, section 402A, by following what was
then a thin line of cases, reformed virtually the entire field of
products liability law as applied to manufacturing defects. The
departure was somewhat tentative in that the comments stated
that the rule was "not exclusive" and did not "preclude liability
based upon the alternative ground of negligence . . . ."" While
the theories were clearly different, most commentators have
agreed that in the area of manufacturing defects, the Restatement principle of strict liability subsumed and therefore has
replaced the theory of negligence. 2 There is no substantial
change in section 1(a) of the new proposed Restatement.
In the first several years after section 402A's adoption and
acceptance into New Jersey law, case law stressed the differences in parallel claims brought under the respective theories of
negligence, warranty, and strict liability. 3 Courts explained in
some detail that the assessment of a design defect claim under
a negligence theory required a focus upon the actions of the
manufacturer in designing the product. Cases turned upon a
determination of whether a manufacturer had acted reasonably

7.
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
8.
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y 1916).
9.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965).
10.
See id. § 2(a).
11.
Id. § 402A cmt. a.
See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
12.
§ 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984) (describing the liability scheme created by section 402A as
"a far cry from negligence"); Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a (noting that
liability for manufacturing defects is imposed regardless of whether the manufacturer
acted reasonably).
13.
See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965)
(discussing the possibility of maintaining an action under each of these theories and
settling on strict liability); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 95 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing bringing actions under both negligence and strict
liability, and claiming that warranty is a subsection of strict liability).
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in deciding how to design the product. 14 For a warranty claim,
however, courts looked at the way the product performed and
determined whether the product met the standards for merchantability under section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). 15 For a strict liability claim, the court examined
whether the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's hands. 6
The theory under which plaintiffs brought claims dictated the
relevant time frame to be examined. To assess a negligence
claim, ajudge looked at the manufacturer's conduct in designing
the product both before and during the manufacturing process.' 7
For a warranty claim, a judge focused on the performance and
condition of the product as it was used and whether it was fit
for its ordinary purposes. For a strict liability claim, the judge
looked at the defect in the product as it left the loading dock.'"
This method proved inadequate. When I had to charge a jury,
or when matters came to me on appeal, my explanations required refinements that demonstrated that the theories substantially overlapped. Recognizing this overlap, in the early 1970s
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the strict liability
claim subsumed both negligence claims and implied warranty
claims that arose outside the commercial context. 19
An article by Sheila Birnbaum, ° written when she was
teaching at New York University Law School, convinced me to
question what I had accepted as basic doctrine: that strict
liability as applied to design defects was a new, broader

14.
See, e.g., Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 627 (N.J. 1996) (holding
that under New Jersey law the case turned on whether the manufacturer's design was
reasonable); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the
reasonableness of manufacturer's conduct is a factor in determining liability).
15.
See, e.g., Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 322 A.2d 440, 443 (N.J. 1974); see
also U.C.C. § 2-314(6) (1994).
16.
See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 149 (N.J.
1979) (holding that a manufacturer would be liable if the product were not safe at the
time of distribution); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 929-30 (N.J.
1981) (holding that the case turned on an evaluation of the product, rather than on the
conduct of the plaintiff).
17.
See, e.g., Freund, 432 A.2d at 932 (discussing the trial court's use of a negligence-based focus on "knowledge and reasonable care," though also determining that
this standard was not the correct one to apply).
18.
See, e.g., Santor, 207 A.2d at 313 (discussing the focus on the product while it
was "in the control of the manufacturer").
See, e.g., Realmuto, 322 A.2d at 443-44 (noting that the plaintiff had claims
19.
under all of these theories but deciding the case on a strict liability theory).
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence
20.
[to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980).
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principle, vastly different from negligence. The article primarily
discussed the various tests for strict liability. Professor
Birnbaum's initial point was that the historical reformulations
from negligence theory through the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) warranty language to Restatement section 402A were
merely different views of the same type of liability.2 ' The point
was well taken. When one looked closely at the strict liability
cause of action, it appeared to be quite similar to a negligence
case.
Professor Birnbaum was not the first to note that strict
liability in the design area did not constitute a radical departure
from negligence. Dean Prosser had stated previously, "Since
proper design is a matter of reasonable fitness, the strict liability adds little or nothing to negligence on the part of the manufacturer .... , 2 2 In addition, Professor Wade had noted, "There
is little difference here between the negligence action and the
action for strict liability."2 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court
eventually concluded, "Thus, once the defendant's knowledge of
the defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes almost
identical to negligence analysis in its focus on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct."24
Under traditional negligence theory, if a plaintiff claimed that
a product was negligently designed, the plaintiff was required
to demonstrate that the manufacturer acted unreasonably in
placing the product, designed as it was, on the market. How
would one prove that the design was unreasonable? First, a
plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the design was not
reasonably safe for an intended or foreseeable use2" and that
this unsafe design aspect was reasonably knowable at the time
the product was manufactured and placed into the stream of
commerce. 26 Of course, the plaintiff was also required to establish the elements of proximate cause and damages.2 The cost

See id. at 601.
21.
22.
PROSSER, supra note 13, § 99, at 659 & n.72.
John W Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tart Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J.
23.
825, 841 (1973).
24.
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984).
25.
See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 207 A.2d 314, 321 (N.J. 1965) (holding that
a house builder could be found negligent for designing and installing a water faucet from
which excessively hot water injured child of lessee).
26.
See Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 199 A.2d 826, 829 (N.J. 1964)
(holding that for a products liability action in negligence the unreasonably dangerous
condition must have existed when the goods left the defendant's hands).
See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 149 (N.J. 1984).
27.
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of such design defects would then fall either on manufacturers,2"
who could raise prices to cover the cost, or on purchasers
throughout the industry who pay increased insurance premiums.

29

For a strict liability claim under section 402A, the product
would have to be proven "unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer" and sold "in a defective condition."3 ° In New Jersey, the "unreasonably dangerous" language has been abandoned
in favor of requiring that the product be "reasonably fit, suitable
and safe for its intended or foreseeable purposes."3 ' Although
semantically different, the meaning remained the same because
New Jersey's courts have interpreted the fitness and suitability
requirement as essentially meaning that the product must be
"reasonably safe"32 instead of, as section 402A provides, not
"unreasonably dangerous."3 3 This is a distinction without a
difference.
What did it mean that the product was in a "defective condition?" In making this determination, analysis under strict
liability did not differ much, if at all, from analysis under
negligence. 4 A product was defective if it was sufficiently
dangerous that a reasonable manufacturer, who was deemed to
know of the product's harmful propensities, would not have
placed it on the market.3 5 Of course, when the key question
28.
See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (N.J. 1965) (noting
that such costs should be borne by manufacturers).
29.
See Wade, supra note 23, at 837-38 (mentioning cost spreading as one factor
to be considered in assessing liability).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
30.
Suter, 406 A.2d at 153. This language was codified and amended at N.J. STAT.
31.
ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987) (establishing that liability turns on whether the "product
causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose
because it: a. deviated from the design specifications ... b. failed to contain adequate
warnings or instructions, or c. was designed in a defective manner"). Despite the
additions to the Suter language, the statute did not change the courts' interpretation
of New Jersey products liability law. See Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., 609 A.2d 487,
493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("While this language departs slightly ... no
doctrinal change was intended." (citations omitted)); see also Jurado v. Western Gear
Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317 (N.J. 1993) (explaining that the legislature did not "intend
that the Act would effect a doctrinal change in the common law").
Ramos v. Silent Hoist & Crane Co., 607 A.2d 667,672 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
32.
1992) (noting installer's hypothetical duty to design winch conduits that are "reasonably
safe" (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2)); see also Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d
1269, 1270-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
33.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
34.
See Suter, 406 A.2d at 150 (noting that when a manufacturer knew of a
35.
product's risks, "the question then becomes whether the defendant was negligent to

WINTER AND SPRING 1997]

A Judge's View

becomes what a "reasonable" manufacturer would do, the
analytical steps have been retraced from strict liability to
negligence. When I came to this realization, I abandoned
attempts to lecture, or even to instruct juries, that there was a
difference between strict liability theory, which requires proof
of the fact of a final defective design, and negligence theory,
which requires proof of a process or conduct creating the defective design. Each requires us to look through the eyes of the
reasonable manufacturer.
Some might claim that a difference exists because under a
negligence theory the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer
knew or should have known of the harmful propensities of the
product, while under a strict liability theory the manufacturer
is deemed to know of such propensities. In fact, some New
Jersey cases turned on this point.3" Closer examination of a
manufacturer's duties, however, reveals that even under negligence law, a manufacturer of a product is deemed to be an
expert in the design and manufacture of the product and is
required to keep up with advances in the field.37 Thus, the
obligations placed on the manufacturer are not limited to
guarding against what the manufacturer in fact knew, but also
entail defending against what the manufacturer should have
known.
It is true that slight differences may remain, even in New
Jersey, between negligence and strict liability analyses in the
context of a design defect claim. In a negligence case, the
plaintiff must prove the applicable standard of care that was
breached.3" In a strict liability case, a defendant/manufacturer
people who might be harmed by that condition if they came into contact with it or were
within the vicinity of it" (quoting Wade, supra note 23, at 835)).
36.
See, e.g., Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1981)
(arguing that such knowledge should be imputed to a manufacturer and reversing a
lower court ruling that would have required plaintiff to prove such knowledge).
37.
See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 647 A.2d 405,
414-15 (Md. 1994) (upholdingjury instructions stating that the manufacturer had a duty
to "keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries touching this
product"); Bordeaux v. Celotex Corp., 511 N.W.2d 899, 905 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding a manufacturer's liability where studies suggesting that asbestos is
dangerous were known industry-wide), appeal denied, 530 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. 1995);
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 387 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the requirement
to keep up with advances in the field includes all information reasonably obtainable in
the industry and is not limited to material that experts produced).
38.
See Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 199 A.2d 826, 829 (N.J. 1964)
(stating that in a negligence action "the plaintiff must show that the goods of which he
complains were unreasonably dangerous for their intended use"); see also O'Brien v.
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claiming that the state-of-the-art standard did not encompass
the technology to correct the defect must prove this fact.3 s
Shifting the burden of proof is a minimal factor in most cases,
however, because jurors' minds are seldom in exact balance after
hearing all of the proofs. There is also a difference in the
defenses available in these types of cases. In a negligence case,
a defendant can attempt to show full comparative fault on the
part of the plaintiff, while in a strict liability case, the defendant
can only raise an assumption of the risk defense.4"
This review leaves aside claims for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability under section 2-314 of the UCC.
The analysis here runs along similar lines. Section 2-314 of the
UCC speaks of goods as being able to "pass without objection in
the trade," "of fair average quality," or most often "fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."4 As with the
strict liability claims, at least in the personal injury setting,
what is "fit" refers back to goods that lacked a defect, which in
turn refers back to products that a reasonable manufacturer
would not have placed on the market. Again this claim is, or
should be, subsumed within the negligence rubric and absorbed
within a strict liability cause of action. New Jersey has excepted
from this general rule only claims for commercial damages

Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 303 (N.J. 1983) ("One of the policy considerations
supporting the imposition of strict liability is easing the burden of proof for a plaintiff
injured by a defective product... by eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff prove
the manufacturer's negligence.").
39.
See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388. The New Jersey Products Liability Act of 1987
has made some changes to products liability law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 to -7
(West 1987). For example, the state-of-the-art defense is now an absolute defense, not
a risk-utility factor. See id. § 2A:58C-3a(1); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447
A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). New Jersey courts toyed with the idea that the difference between
negligence and strict liability would be that in a strict liability claim the manufacturer
would be deemed to know even that which could not have been known at the time of
distribution. The Beshada holding was limited to its facts two years later. See Feldman,
479 A.2d at 387, in which a manufacturer was held only to a duty of knowing that which
is knowable, whether the claim rested on negligence or strict liability. See id. at 387.
40.
See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, Etc., 212 A.2d 769, 782 (N.J. 1965) (noting
the availability of a contributory negligence defense to a strict liability claim where
plaintiffhas "unreasonably proceed[ed to encounter a known danger" (quoting WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 95 (3rd ed. 1964))); see also Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 831 (N.J. 1978) (relying on Cintrone),overruled
by Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979). Suter then
overruled Cepeda in worker's actions where a plaintiffs conduct cannot be used as a
defense due to a lack of meaningful choice. See Suter, 406 A.2d at 148. This exception
has, in turn, also been applied to negligence cases. See Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp.,
471 A.2d 15, 20 (N.J. 1984).
41.
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1994).
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where the loss is limited to the product itself or other purely
economic losses.4 2 The case law has left the parties in such cases
to the UCC's contractual remedies.
A number of states have enacted statutes completely merging
the two causes of action.43 New Jersey permits an exception only
for breaches of express warranties." New York, which does not
have such a statute, has recently broken with this approach,
stressing the doctrinal differences between warranty and strict
liability actions. In Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 45 the New York
Court of Appeals maintained the strict liability and warranty
of merchantability distinction when answering certified questions from the Second Circuit. 46 There are difficulties with each
of these approaches.
Turning first to Denny: After finding that the Ford Bronco II
manufactured and sold by defendant Ford Motor Co. was not
defective, ostensibly because its high center of gravity was
appropriate for its intended off-road operation, the jury nonetheless found Ford liable for having breached its warranty of
merchantability. 47 Upholding the continued viability of both
causes of action, the New York Court of Appeals read the
comments to the Restatement (Third)section 2(b) as supporting
its analysis.48 Under the Tentative Draft comments, however,
alternative remedies in a personal injury setting are appropriate
only in cases that involve "misrepresentation, express warranty
and implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose," 49 and
not warranties of merchantability.
Moreover, as the Denny court noted, numerous other states
have abolished the distinction between all separate causes of

42.
See Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 676 (N.J. 1985).
This exception was codified by the New Jersey Products Liability Act, which defined
recoverable "harm," as, inter alia, "physical damage to property, other than to the
product itself." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A=58C-lb(2).
43.

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(b) (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3302(c)

(1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(4) (West 1992). These statutes appear to be
in line with the standard proposed by the Department of Commerce in Section 102(D)
of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,715, 62,717 (1979).
44.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-l(b)(3) (West 1987); see also ALA. CODE § 6-5501(2) (1975) (permitting an exception for actions based on breach of written express
warranties).
45.
662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995), reargumentdenied by 664 N.E.2d 1261 (N.Y. 1996).
46.
See id. at 739.
47.
See id. at 733.
48.
See id. at 737.
49.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiA3ILITY § 2 cmt. m illus. 14
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 21. This version was available to the New York Court of Appeals. The Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, takes
the same position.
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action for express or implied warranties, negligence, and strict
liability.5" The court's conclusion may have been a natural
outcome of its acceptance of the parties' arguments separating
the vehicle's off-the-road use and its use as a general highway
vehicle.5 ' The court considered defendant's proofs regarding the
vehicle's off-the-road use relevant to a strict products liability
risk-utility equation, and plaintiff's proofs concerning defendant's promotion of the vehicle for general purposes as relevant
to the "ordinary purpose" analysis and the vehicle's unfitness for
such purposes. I suggest that this dichotomy was unnecessary.
So long as the vehicle's general use was reasonably anticipated, that use provided a proper basis for virtually the same
implied warranty of merchantability or strict liability claims. If
the higher center of gravity was found necessary for the vehicle's
off-the-road use, but the vehicle was also marketed to the public
for general use, the alleged flaw was not a design defect at all
but a possible warning defect, well beyond the breach of the
warranty of merchantability.
If a particular buyer received express or implied warranties
concerning the vehicle's safe use for the highway, other issues
arise. The warranty of merchantability would be subsumed
properly within a claim for strict liability, but the breaches of
an express warranty or a warranty for fitness for a particular
purpose properly would be left as additional or alternative
claims of breach of contract.
By case law for the past twenty years 53 and by statute for the
past eight years,54 New Jersey has permitted separate claims,
beyond strict liability, only for express warranties. While the
1987 New Jersey statute may have substantially codified New
Jersey's common law, this statute and the comparable similar
statutes in other states have left a gap that properly should be
filled by the warranty for fitness for a particular purpose.5 5 Its
absence requires a strained interpretation, either of express
warranty or of strict liability, to redress an obvious wrong if one
occurs.

50.
See Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 736-37 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572(m) (1983);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3302(c) (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.900 (1995); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 772.010(4) (West 1992)).
51.
See Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 738.

52.
53.

See id. at 738-39.
See Realmuto v. Straube Motors, Inc., 322 A.2d 440, 442 (N.J. 1974); Heavner

v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 420 (N.J. 1973).
54.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-lb(3) (West 1987).
55.
See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1994).
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For example, assume that a police officer purchases a bulletproof vest by telling the dealer that the officer needs a vest
that will protect against Teflon armor-piercing bullets. The
dealer, without saying anything, hands the officer the best vest
made at that time, but one that will not provide the required
protection. There is no express warranty; there is no reasonable
alternative product; and in traditional terms there is no defect.
There is, however, a clear breach of the implied warranty of
fitness for the particular purpose made known to the dealer.56
The warranty is needed to provide legal recourse if the officer
is later injured when the vest affords no protection against a
Teflon bullet.
One could say that there was a warning defect in that there
should have been a written or oral warning, and this proposition
is perhaps true under a general negligence theory. Analysis of
a warning defect takes into consideration the class of intended
57
or reasonably anticipated users, not the particular user,
however, and it may well be that the class of users was generally aware of the lack of protection for the specific use that the
particular buyer had expressed. While the New York approach
may have gone too far in the preservation of all warranty
claims,5" and the New Jersey courts and legislature may have
gone too far in superseding all but express warranties, the new
Restatement (Third) approach properly preserves both the express warranty and the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.5 9
Keeping this background in mind, I will now discuss the
different considerations a judge faces when treating a design
defect claim under the standards of either the Restatement
(Second) or the proposed Restatement (Third). As noted earlier,
the purposes of the Restatement are to reflect the law as it is
and to make the law more understandable. 6' Through the
Restatement (Second) the ALI attempted to make the law more
understandable and reflective of the developing cases concerning

56.
See id.
57.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmts. h, i; see also O'Brien v. Muskin
Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 303 (N.J. 1983) (noting the manufacturer's duty to warn "foreseeable users of the risks inherent in the use of that product"); Campos v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 469 A.2d 943, 952 (N.J. App. Div. 1983) (Dreier, J., dissenting) (noting
the distinction between duties to a class of uses of a product and to a particular user
of a product), rev'd, 485 A.2d 305, 311 (N.J. 1984).
58.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
59.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. n.
60.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
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the distribution of defective products by permitting a court to
tell a jury that it should focus on the defective nature of the
product, rather than on conduct. In cases involving design
defects, as opposed to manufacturing defects, this explanation
permitted a focus upon the dangerous nature of a product that
could have been made less dangerous. In practice, as noted
above, design defect cases have remained negligence cases,6 '
with perhaps a slightly shifted focus.
As the Reporters examined the cases decided under section
402A, they came to the conclusion that the cases, whether
applying a consumer expectations test or a risk-utility analysis,
possessed a common thread.62 Most courts demanded that plaintiffs present alternative designs that would have made the
product safer and would have reduced or avoided the risks that
caused their injuries. 63 This was similarly true under negligence
law, where a plaintiff had to prove that the product created an
unreasonable risk of harm as designed by showing that another
design would have been more reasonable.64 Plaintiffs will
continue to present the same proofs under section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third). In fact, central to the Restatement (Third)
is the explicit focus on the ability to prove that there would be
a "reasonable alternative design" that would have reduced or
avoided the foreseeable risks of harm, the omission of which
rendered the product not reasonably safe.65
The simplicity of this new standard raises some eyebrows. One
may ask: Where are the other elements of the risk-utility
analysis? Are we to abandon the multi-part test that looked not
only at the availability of a substitute product, but also at the
usefulness, desirability, and safety aspects of the product? Also
considered as part of the risk-utility equation were the manufacturer's ability to eliminate unsafe characteristics without impairing usefulness or increasing expense, the user's ability to
avoid danger in the exercise of care, the public's anticipated
66
awareness of dangers, and the manufacturer's risk-spreading.
The easy answer to these questions is that all of these factors
are and will remain proper elements in determining the

61.
See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
62.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
63.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 49, § 2 reporters' note cmt. c.
64.
See id.
65.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2(b).
66.
See Wade, supra note 23, at 827 n.11.
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feasibility of the alternative design. The problem with the
current risk-utility formulation is that it has placed the alternative design, which is the central element to which the others
merely relate, on an equal basis with the other factors. The
Reporters have made this clear in comment a of section 2.67
One then may ask: What has happened to the "consumer
expectations," "open and obvious," or "patent danger" tests?
Again, these tests, often considered in opposition to a risk-utility
test, are not really inimical to it in any way. Rather, they are
factors used to determine whether there is a reasonable alternative design. The Reporters are clear in their notes 1 (Part V) and
4 to comment c that these factors bear upon whether an alternative design would have avoided or reduced the foreseeable risks
of harm.6 8
Although most of the discussion concerning section 2 has
focused upon the "reasonable alternative design," one must not
forget that section 2(b) has two principal elements; the alternative design is not the sole standard. The second requirement, at
the end of the section, is that "the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.""9 Implicit in
this phrase is the need for reasonable safety to the user or
others expected to come into contact with the product. This
element permits us to focus upon the intended or foreseeable
user to determine whether she would recognize possibly unsafe
characteristics of the product and guard against them. The
totality of section 2(b), therefore, presents a double objective
test: the reasonable manufacturer determining what the ordinary consumer would expect. °

67.
68.
69.
70.

See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2.
See id. § 2 reporters' notes cmt. c, at 145-55, 167-72.
Id. § 2.
New Jersey provides an absolute defense if a manufacturer can prove that

[tihe characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user,
and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent
characteristic of the product and that would be recognized by the ordinary person
who uses or consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the
class of persons for whom the product is intended ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(2) (West 1987). An exception to this absolute defense is
carved out for "industrial machinery or other equipment used in the workplace and...
dangers posed by products such as machinery or equipment that can feasibly be
eliminated without impairing the usefulness of the product." Id. Prior to this statute's
adoption in 1987, these were merely factors that the jury could take into consideration
to determine whether the product was defective. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (N.J. 1979); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d
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The focus on alternative design and reasonable safety permits
the jury to balance what the manufacturer has done against the
plaintiffs specific claim of what the manufacturer should have
done. If the product's design could have been rendered safer, the
safer design will produce an alternative product that can be
shown or described to a jury. The plaintiff must present the jury
with the particulars of this design. Thus, a jury is not left to
speculate whether some more reasonable design exists.
Other questions remain, such as whether an optional "extra
cost" safety device, such as anti-lock brakes, automatically provides a plaintiff with an "alternative design" because such a
safety feature could have been made standard. Such a device
should not be an automatic alternative design, so long as the
alternatives are offered, and the product without the option
meets a suitable standard of reasonable safety, which is the
second element of section 2(b). 71 In products such as these, a
history of consumer acceptance of optional safety features can
help define reasonableness. Some may disagree, particularly in
cases where the plaintiff is a third party who has had no input
into the selection of the safety option. Case development in this
area, however, is no different than under the present section
402A using a risk-utility or consumer expectations analysis.
In cases where a plaintiff cannot pinpoint the nature of the
defect, section 3 of the proposed Restatement permits an inference of a defect from circumstantial evidence in situations where
res ipsa loquitur would apply.72 This section usually will apply

816, 827 (N.J. 1978). The statute has altered the entire concept of contributory fault.
If a manufacturer can determine that the class of users would have appreciated and
avoided the danger, the absolute defense is established. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A58c3(a)(2). A jury never need reach the issue of whether the particular plaintiff proceeded
in the face of a known danger, a requirement for contributory (comparative) fault in New
Jersey in a products liability case. See Johansen v. Makita USA, Inc., 607 A.2d 637, 642
(N.J. 1992). In effect, the statute establishes an objective test as a bar to liability which,
even if passed, still presents the plaintiff with a second bar based upon contributory
fault.
71.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2.
72.
The language of this section as set forth in Proposed Final Draft, supra note
1, § 3, represents a substantial change from Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 62.
Although the Proposed Final Draft may itself be further revised for its 1997 presentation
to the ALI membership, the 1996 draft reads:
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of the
specific nature of the defect, when:
(a) the incident that harmed the plaintiff was of a kind that ordinarily would
occur only as a result of product defect; and
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to manufacturing defect claims, but also can apply to a design
defects claim in appropriate circumstances. Of course, a proper
foundation must be established, but expert proof is not required
where the presence of some defect reasonably can be inferred by
a jury.
Under the proposed language of section 2(b), a defendant can
now assess the plaintiffs claim in sharper focus. This focus
should facilitate settlements. The requirement for a specified
alternative design also provides a more definite standard for
judges deciding summary judgment motions and for experts
preparing reports and testimony. Vague statements that the
design should have been safer or should have been different
should no longer plague judges hearing summary judgment
motions. The standard, implicit even under section 402A, is
explicit under section 2(b).
This is not to say that a plaintiff must always present an
expert. Experts may or may not be necessary to prove a plaintiffs claim under the Restatement (Third)'s new formulation,
depending upon the complexity of the design. The use of experts
under section 2(b) will be no different from the situation under
section 402A, or even under negligence law. If the issue is
beyond the common knowledge of a jury, the parties must
produce experts. A reasonable alternative design that can be
understood by a jury needs no expert to present it, although it
may be tactically advisable to retain one.
The change in language is not radical. The standards of
section 2(b) represent what actually has occurred in the many
cases tried before me or that I have reviewed on appeal. Therefore, I see no break in the progress of the law inherent in the
new terminology.
There is one possible problem with the language of section
2(b), which the Reporters have recognized. Section 2(b) focuses
only upon whether there is a reasonable alternative design, thus
measuring the product as marketed against a proposed alternative. But what if there is no reasonable alternative design

(b) evidence in the particular case supports the conclusion that more probably
than not:
(1) The incident that harmed the plaintiff was the result of a product defect
rather than being solely the result of other possible causes; and
(2) the product defect existed at the time of sale or distribution.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 3.
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because the design defect in the product is such that it should
not have been marketed in any form?
Two classes of cases raise this issue: first, egregiously unsafe
or ultrahazardous products and, second, products that lack any
efficacy. v3 As the Reporters state in note 1 to section 2 comment
d, 4 the only recognition of the ultrahazardous claim has been
in a statutory exception to the state-of-the-art defense rule in
the New Jersey statute.7 5 Pursuant to that statute, a state-ofthe-art defense is not permitted where a "product is egregiously
unsafe or ultra-hazardous" and a consumer could not reasonably
be expected to know of the product's risks, or where the product
poses risks to others and has little or no usefulness.7 6 Examples
given in the New Jersey Senate Committee Statement accompanying the bill were of "a deadly toy marketed for use by young
children, or of a product marketed for use in dangerous criminal
activities."vv
Even with this description, it is difficult to find cases where
one could not say there would be an alternative design. The
most frequently given example centers on the lawn dart cases,"
but one could posit easily an alternative design which used a
velcro-tipped weighted beanbag head for the darts and a suitably prepared landing area. The alternative to the Saturday
Night Special could be a somewhat more expensive, but properly manufactured, handgun. In Moning v. Alfonso, v9 a case
involving a sling-shot, it might be difficult to come up with an
alternative design, but there the case focused on marketing, not
on the product itself.8 ° Many dangerous products are simply not
suitable for marketing to young children. One would not call
most hunting implements defective merely because the market
73.
See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978) (noting
that a jury could find liability even where no reasonable alternative design existed for
the product in question if it determined that a "reasonable manufacturer would not have
introduced such a product into the stream of commerce").
74.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2 reporters' notes cmt. d.
75.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-3(b).
76.
See id. § 2A:58C-3.
77.
Senate Judiciary Committee Statement, No. 2805-L.1987, c.197 (1987), reprinted
in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1; see, e.g., Kelleyv. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1148
(Md. 1985) (involving a Saturday Night Special; rule overturned by subsequent statute);
Moning v. Alfonso, 254 N.W.2d 759, 769-74 (Mich. 1977) (involving a sling-shot
marketed as a toy).
78.
See, e.g., Atkins v. Arlans Dep't Store of Norman, Inc., 522 P.2d 1020, 1022
(Okla. 1974) (upholding a trial court ruling in favor of the defendants in part because
plaintiffs had not alleged that the injury in question was caused by a design defect).
79.
254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977).
80.
See id. at 766.
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properly should be limited to responsible adults. This problem,
however, may be met by new language proposed by the Reporters in comment d to section 2(b).
In the second potentially troublesome area-products lacking
efficacy-I can foresee particular pharmaceutical cases in which
there would be a claim of complete lack of efficacy so that the
language of section 2(b) may be inadequate. Such cases might
concern drugs that have no use but are still marketed, causing
patients to turn away from other treatment with possible
benefits. There is no alternative design, yet the product should
not have been marketed at all.
These cases might best be handled as warning defect cases,
or else should be left to administrative regulation. They are
really extensions of cases where a product has a very limited
range of use, and suitable instructions are needed. When this
limited range narrows to zero, any danger outweighs the total
lack of usefulness. The requirement to warn of such a total lack
of efficacy presents a more understandable rule than one that
would find the product defectively designed.
This efficacy issue usually arises in cases involving pharmaceuticals, and the Reporters have taken the entire area of
prescription drugs and medical devices out of the ambit of
section 2(b) and included the topic in a separate section (section
8) under Special Product Markets. 81 The presence of this issue,
relating to this special class of products, should not disturb what
is a more understandable general statement of design defect
liability. Where the lack of efficacy relates to a nonmedical
product (such as the example given earlier of the protective vest
sold to protect against armor-piercing ammunition that cannot
stop a Teflon bullet), the issue is not that of a design defect, but
rather a warning defect, or possibly of a breach of an express
warranty or a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
In short, theoretically there should be a black letter addition
to section 2(b) regarding products that should not be marketed
at all. This omission, however, has been explained in the reporters' notes,8 2 and unless or until any sizeable number of these
cases come to light, the Reporters have made a reasonable
decision not to clutter the black letter rule of section 2(b) with
the elements of a design defect claim based upon such products.

81.
82.

See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 8.
See id. § 2 reporters' notes cmt. c., at 124-35.
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I realize that there are many critics of the new language."3
Some are concerned that judges or attorneys may not read the
section with care or may not consult the comments, and thus
may assume that section 2(b) envisions a radical change in the
law. I do not share the critics' narrow views of judges' perceptions, and I have confidence that attorneys faced with interpretation problems will find textual answers in the section and
comments that will satisfy a court.
Whether from the position of a judge explaining the matter
to a jury, or from that of a litigant presenting or defending the
case in court, it is easy to see that in section 2(b) the Reporters
have defined the pivotal elements of a design defect case. The
practical focus on alternative design and reasonable safety
existed before section 402A. Indeed, these factors were at the
very heart of section 402A. Under the proposed Restatement
(Third) the law has not changed. Rather, the concepts behind
it have been explained more precisely. As a result, it will now
be easier to understand the law itself.

83.
See, e.g., Angela C. Rushton, Design Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of a FunctionalApproach, 45
EMORY L.J. 389, 419 (1996); Shapo, supra note 2, at 659; Frank J. Vandall, The
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMP.
L. REV. 167, 168 (1995). See generally Symposium, On The ALI's ProposedRestatement
(Third)of Torts:ProductsLiability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043 (1994); Symposium, Proposed
Restatement (Third)of Torts, Products Liability, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 369 (1995);
Symposium, Review of the System of Products Liability Law, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 227
(1995); John F. Vargo, The Emperor'sNew Clothes: The American Law InstituteAdorns
A 'New Cloth"forSection 402A ProductsLiabilityDesign Defects-A Survey of the States
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996).

